Fast-Converging Tatonnement Algorithms for the Market Problem by Cole, R & Fleischer, L
Dartmouth College 
Dartmouth Digital Commons 
Computer Science Technical Reports Computer Science 
8-23-2007 
Fast-Converging Tatonnement Algorithms for the Market Problem 
R Cole 
New York University 
L Fleischer 
Dartmouth College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/cs_tr 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation 
Cole, R and Fleischer, L, "Fast-Converging Tatonnement Algorithms for the Market Problem" (2007). 
Computer Science Technical Report TR2007-602. https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/cs_tr/303 
This Technical Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science at Dartmouth Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Computer Science Technical Reports by an authorized 
administrator of Dartmouth Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
dartmouthdigitalcommons@groups.dartmouth.edu. 
Fast-Converging Tatonnement Algorithms for the Market Problem ∗
R. Cole† L. Fleischer‡
August 23, 2007
Abstract
Why might markets tend toward and remain near equilibrium prices? In an effort to shed light on this question from
an algorithmic perspective, this paper defines and analyzes two simple tatonnement algorithms that differ from previous
algorithms that have been subject to asymptotic analysis in three significant respects: the price update for a good depends
only on the price, demand, and supply for that good, and on no other information; the price update for each good occurs
distributively and asynchronously; the algorithms work (and the analyses hold) from an arbitrary starting point.
Our algorithm introduces a new and natural update rule. We show that this update rule leads to fast convergence toward
equilibrium prices in a broad class of markets that satisfy the weak gross substitutes property. These are the first analyses
for computationally and informationally distributed algorithms that demonstrate polynomial convergence.
Our analysis identifies three parameters characterizing the markets, which govern the rate of convergence of our proto-
cols. These parameters are, broadly speaking:
1. A bound on the fractional rate of change of demand for each good with respect to fractional changes in its price.
2. A bound on the fractional rate of change of demand for each good with respect to fractional changes in wealth.
3. The relative demand for money at equilibrium prices.
We give two protocols. The first assumes global knowledge of only the first parameter. For this protocol, we also provide
a matching lower bound in terms of these parameters. Our second protocol assumes no global knowledge whatsoever.
∗Dartmouth Computer Science Technical Report TR2007-602. This work was supported in part by NSF grant CCF 0515127.
†cole @cs .nyu .edu. Computer Science Department, Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York University, 251 Mercer Street, New
York, NY 10012-1185, USA.
‡lkf @cs .dartmouth .edu. Department of Computer Science, 6211 Sudikoff, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA.
1 Introduction
The impetus for this work comes from the following question: why are well-functioning markets able to stay at or near
equilibrium prices?1 This raises two issues: what are plausible price adjustment mechanisms and in what types of markets
are they effective?
This question was originally considered by Walras in 1874, when he suggested that prices adjust by tatonnement:
upward if there is too much demand and downward if too little [26]. Since then, the study of market equilibria, their
existence, stability, and their computation has received much attention in Economics, Operations Research, and most
recently in Computer Science. Of late, this has led to a considerable number of polynomial time algorithms for finding
approximate and exact equilibria in a variety of markets with divisible goods. However, these algorithms do not seek to,
and do not appear to provide methods that might plausibly explain these markets’ behavior.
We argue here for the relevance of this question from a computer science perspective. Much justification for looking
at the market problem in computer science stems from the following argument: If economic models and statements about
equilibrium and convergence are to make sense as being realizable in economies, then they should be concepts that are
computationally tractable. Our viewpoint is that it is not enough to show that the problems are computationally tractable;
it is also necessary to show that they are tractable in a model that might capture how a market works. Unless one has a
controlled economy, markets surely do not perform overt global computations, using global information.
In formalizing the tatonnement model, economists have proposed models to capture aspects of how a market might
work; and convergence of several of these formalizations has been demonstrated for some types of markets [1, 2, 18, 24].
However, there is no demonstration that these proposed models converge reasonably quickly. Indeed, without care in the
specific details, they won’t.2
We propose a model that captures important characteristics of models proposed in the economic literature, features that
are lacking from previous algorithms subject to asymptotic analysis. Namely, our algorithms consist of price updates satis-
fying the following three criteria: the price update for a good depends only on the price, demand, and supply for that good,
and on no other information about the market; the price update for each good occurs distributively and asynchronously;
the algorithms can start with an arbitrary set of prices. We show that our update protocols converge quickly in markets that
satisfy the weak gross substitutes property. In the process, we identify three natural parameters characterizing markets that
govern the rate of convergence.
Another distributed price update protocol was given in a STOC 2005 paper of Codenotti, McCune, and Varadarajan [4].
However, it does not meet our criteria, which is not surprising as it was not seeking to address the question raised in our
paper.3
At this point it will be helpful to define the market problem.
TheMarket Problem. Amarket consists of set of goodsG, with |G| = n, and agentsA, with |A| = m. The goods are
assumed to be infinitely divisible. Each agent l starts with an allocation wil of good i. Each agent l has a utility function
ul(x1l, · · · , xnl) expressing its preferences: if l prefers a basket with xil units (possibly a real number) of good i, to the
basket with yil units, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then ul(x1l, · · · , xnl) > ul(y1l, · · · , ynl). Each agent l intends to trade goods so as
to achieve a personal optimal combination (basket) of goods given the constraints imposed by their initial allocation. The
trade is driven by a collection of prices pi for good i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Agent l chooses xil, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, so as to maximize ul,
subject to the basket being affordable, that is:
∑n
i=1 xilpi ≤
∑n
i=1 wilpi. Prices p = (p1, p2, · · · , pn) are said to provide
an equilibrium if, in addition, the demand for each good is bounded by the supply:
∑m
j=1 xil ≤
∑m
l=1 wil. The market
problem is to find equilibrium prices.4
Standard notation: wi =
∑
l wil is the supply of good i. xi =
∑
l xil is the demand for good i, and zi = xi − wi is the
excess demand for good i (which can be positive or negative). vl =
∑
i wilpi is the wealth of buyer l given prices p. Note
that while w is part of the specification of the market, v, x and z are functions of the vector of prices: v directly so, and x
and z as determined by individual agents maximizing their utility functions subject to v.
1We are not concerned with the question of whether this assertion is indeed correct.
2Of the referenced papers, only one formalization [24] is a discrete algorithm, and, as we make more specific later, it may not converge quickly.
3For this protocol first transforms the market using information about all the goods (global information); it uses a global approximation parameter
in the price updates; it uses synchronous price updates; and it starts with an initial price point that is restricted to lie within a bounded region containing
the equilibrium point.
4Equilibria exist under quite mild conditions (see [16] §17.C, for example).
1
We follow standard practice5 and view the actions of individual buyers and sellers as being encapsulated in the price
adjustments for each good. More specifically, we imagine that there is a separate, “virtual” price setter for each good in
the market. Henceforth, for ease of exposition, we describe price setters as if they were actual entities, although in reality
they are virtual entities induced by agents’ trades.
Market Properties. In an effort to capture the distributed nature of markets and the likely limited computational power
of individual interactions and consequently of each of the virtual price setters, we impose several constraints on procedures
we wish to consider:
1. Limited information: the (virtual) price setter for good i knows only the price, supply, and excess demand of good
i, both current and past history. Thus the price updates can depend on this information only. Notably, this precludes
the use not only of other prices or demands, but also of any information about the specific form of utility functions.
2. Simple actions: The price setters’ procedures should be simple.
3. Asynchrony: Price updates for different goods are allowed to be asynchronous.
4. Fast Convergence: The price update procedure should converge quickly toward equilibrium prices from any initial
price vector.
We call procedures that satisfy the first three constraints local, by contrast with centralized procedures that use complete
(global) information about the market.
Next, we discuss the motivations for these constraints.
Constraint (1) stems from the plausible assertion that not everything about the market will be known to a single price
setter. While no doubt some information about several goods is known to a price setter, it is a conservative assumption to
assume less is known, for any convergence result carries over to the broader setting. Further, it is far from clear how to
model the broader setting.
Constraint (2), simplicity, is in the eye of the beholder. Its presence reflects our view that without further information,
this is both generally applicable and plausible.
Constraint (3), asynchrony, is an inherent property of independent price adjustments. Since the price setter of good i
reacts only to trade in good i, the price adjustment of good i occurs independently of other price adjustments.
Constraint (4) arises in an effort to recognize the dynamic nature of real markets, which are subject to changing supplies
and demands over time. However, surely much of the time, markets are changing gradually, for otherwise there would be
no predictability. A natural approximation is to imagine fixed conditions and seek to come close to an equilibrium in the
time they prevail — hence the desire for rapid convergence.
1.1 Our Contribution
We describe new and natural local price update protocols that converge quickly toward equilibrium prices starting from
arbitrary initial prices: the longer they run, the closer they come. To specify this more precisely we need to define the
computational model, our complexity measure, and our measure for approximation quality.
Computational Model: Since we are proposing a model for how a market might reach equilibrium, instead of how one
might compute an equilibrium given all the information about the market, our computational model is a bit different from
the standard computer science model. Our model is based on iterations, defined below.
Iteration r:
1. Simultaneously for each good i in some subset Gr of goods, the price setter for good i updates the price of good i
using knowledge only of pi, zi, and the history of pi and zi.
2. Given new prices pr, agents compute the wealth they could achieve by selling all their goods, and express their
interest in a set of goods that maximizes their utility subject to their current wealth. Thus, utility functions are
revealed only implicitly and partially through the aggregate demands for goods subject to a price vector.
It might seem more natural that the price setter for a good i that has not yet updated the price would use an old value
of the excess demand, or perhaps some convex combination of the excess demands seen since the last price update. As it
turns out, our analysis works for any of these variants, yielding the same tight bounds without any change to the argument.
This provides further evidence that the update procedure proposed here is robust.
5See Varian [25] §21.5.
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Complexity measure: As is standard for asynchronous algorithms, we measure the complexity in rounds. The basic unit
of time is a price update iteration as specified above. A round comprises a minimum length sequence of iterations in which
every price updates at least once. The rounds are specified uniquely by defining them beginning from a fixed start time.
b-Bounded asynchrony: Sometimes it is useful to limit the extend of the asynchrony. We define b-bounded asynchrony
to impose the requirement that in a single round any price updates at most b times.
Approximation quality: The main approach in the Computer Science literature has been to define the quality of an
equilibria as 1 −  = minl{ul(Al)/ul(Optl)}, where the minimization is over all agents l in the market, ul is l’s utility
function, Al is the allocation of goods agent l receives and Optl is its preferred affordable allocation at the prevailing
prices (i.e over all agents, what is the worst allocation percentage-wise measured in terms of the utility functions). This
does not seem a feasible approach in our setting, where no allocation mechanism is specified, where there is no direct
knowledge of the agents’ utilities, and our algorithms are just responding to excess demands and not to the degree to which
agents wish to change their allocations. Instead, we simply measure the distance from the equilibrium prices, p∗i , directly:
maxi |p∗i − pi|/p∗i .
Our update algorithms: We analyze protocols where price setters use the rule
pi ← pi(1 + λimin{1, zi/wi}). (1)
The price of money remains at one.
This is a novel proposal for a price update. For example, it differs significantly from the update suggested by
Uzawa [24] in that it scales a bounded excess demand by the current price. These differences are crucial for enabling
a proof of rapid convergence. In particular, the min term prevents overreaction to large values of zi; these can be un-
bounded in their effect in Uzawa’s algorithm. The scaling by pi can also improve the rate of convergence significantly.
We begin by analyzing the protocol when λi is fixed for all goods i, and given by a simple characteristic of the market.
Our motivation for this is two-fold. First, in stable markets, it seems reasonable that the appropriate stepsizes for the price
adjustments are known (within constant factors). Second, such an analysis has not been done before, and it is helpful to
understand this case first.
We then analyze an oblivious protocol where the appropriate choice of λi is not known at the start, and is therefore
repeatedly adjusted to ensure that it is eventually small enough for convergence. This is intended to capture markets that
are adjusting to new conditions.
The performance of both algorithms depends on several global parameters of the market. These relate to how effectively
surpluses and scarcities signal the level of price inequities. The parameters are denoted by α, β,E, where α, β ≤ 1 and
E ≥ 1. The parameter α reflects the agents’ collective utility for money relative to other goods, at equilibrium prices. 6
As we show (see Section 3), the smaller the relative utility, the slower the convergence rate. The parameter E bounds the
elasticity of demand with respect to prices. A large E implies that small adjustments to the prices may have a large effect
on demand, thus for convergence, it is necessary to have smaller price adjustments. As we show in this paper, it suffices
that λi = O(1/E). Finally, β parametrizes a lower bound on the rate of change of demand with respect to changes in
wealth. If β is small, then even a large change in price might have only a small effect on demand. Thus, any procedure
basing price updates on excess demand would require more updates when β is smaller.
In suitable markets (specified in Section 3), we show that our first algorithm improves the accuracy of the least accurate
price by at least one bit in O(E/(αβ)) rounds. (For small prices, this means doubling the price; for large ones, this means
halving it; and for prices pi close to equilibrium price p∗i , this means halving |p∗i − pi|.) In the Appendix we show that
there are examples for which this complexity bound is tight for our update procedures.
Our second algorithm is oblivious in that it does not assume that a convergent value for λi is known. Instead the
protocol for good i gradually reduces the value of λi. To obtain a complexity bound, we need to assume b-bounded
asynchrony, and then we obtain roughly the square of the above complexity. Specifically, to obtain a d-bit improvement in
accuracy requires O( bα2β2 (E
2 + d2)) rounds.
1.2 Previous Work
To the best of our knowledge, asynchronous price update algorithms have not been considered previously. Further, there
has been no complexity analysis of even synchronous tatonnement algorithms with this type of limited information. While
6In Section 2 we define the concept of a numeraire. We identify money as the numeraire, since it is a natural choice. The parameter α reflects the
relative utility for the numeraire, which in this case is money.
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Uzawa [24] gave a synchronous algorithm of this type, he only showed convergence, and did not address speed of conver-
gence.
The existence of market equilibria has been a central topic of economics since the problem was formulated by Walras
in 1874 [26]. Tatonnement was described more precisely as a differential equation by Samuelson [20]:
dpi/dt = µizi. (2)
The µi are arbitrary positive constants that represent rates of adjustment for the different prices; they need not all be the
same. Arrow, Block, and Hurwitz, and Nikaido and Uzawa [1, 2, 18] showed that for markets of gross substitutes the above
differential equation will converge to an equilibrium price.
Unfortunately, for general utility functions (i.e. that do not lead to gross substitutability), the equilibrium need not be
stable and the differential equation (and thus also discretized versions) need not converge [21]. Partly in response, Smale
described a convergent procedure that uses the derivative matrix of excess demands with respect to prices [23]. Following
this, Saari and Simon [19] showed that any price update algorithm which uses an update that is a fixed function of excesses
and their derivatives with respect to prices needs to use essentially all the derivatives in order to converge in all markets.
This is viewed as being an excessive amount of information, in general.
There are really two questions here. The first is how to find an equilibrium, and the second is how does the market find
an equilibrium. The first question is partially addressed by the work of Arrow et al. and Smale, and addressed further in
papers in operations research (notably Scarf [22] gives a (non-polynomial) algorithm for computing equilibrium prices),
and theoretical computer science, where there are a series of very nice results demonstrating equilibria as the solutions
to convex programs, or describing combinatorial algorithms to compute such equilibria exactly or approximately. (An
early example of a polynomial algorithm for computing market equilibria for restricted settings is [7]. An extensive list of
references is given in the survey [5].)
We are interested in the second question. The differential equations provide a start here, but they ignore the discrete
nature of markets: prices typically change in discrete increments, not continuously. In 1960, Uzawa showed that there is
a choice of λ for which an obvious discrete analog of (2) does converge [24]. However, determining the right λ depends
on knowing properties of the matrix of derivatives of demand with respect to price, or in other words, this requires global
information.
More recently, three separate groups have proposed three distinct discrete update algorithms for finding equilibrium
prices and showed that their algorithms converge in markets of gross substitutes [15, 6, 4]. However, all of these algorithms
use global information. With the exception of [4], none of this work gives (good) bounds on the rate of convergence. The
algorithm in Codenotti et al. [4] appears to be a local algorithm (albeit not asynchronous); however, it begins by modifying
the market by introducing a fictitious player with some convenient properties that capture global information about the
market and have a profound effect on market behavior. Translating their algorithm back into the real market, it is neither
simple nor local.
There are some auction-style algorithms for finding approximate equilibria which also have a distributed flavor but
depend on buyer utilities being separable over the set of goods [10, 11]. However, these algorithms are not seeking to
explain market behavior and not surprisingly do not obey natural properties of markets.7
The design and analysis of procedures and convergence to equilibria has been a recent topic of study for game theoretic
problems as well. Examples include studying convergence in some network routing and network design games [3, 9, 12,
17]. In partial contrast, it is known that finding equilibria via local search (e.g., via best response dynamics) is PLS-
complete in many contexts [14, 8]. Recently, Hart and Mansour [13] gave communication complexity lower bounds to
show that in general games, players with limited information require an exponential (in the number of players) number of
steps to reach an equilibrium.
1.3 Road map
In Section 2 we give some relevant definitions. In Section 3 we specify our protocols and results. In Section 4.1 we prove
an upper bound on the rate of convergence of the fixed protocol for gross substitute markets with parameters α, β,E. In
Section 4.2, we prove an upper bound on the rate of convergence for the oblivious protocol. In the Appendix, we prove
lower bounds on the rate of convergence of the fixed protocol.
7These algorithms start their computation at a non-arbitrary set of artificially low prices; global information is used for price initialization; and they
work with a global approximation measure — each price update uses the goal approximation guarantee in its update.
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2 Definitions and Notation
A market satisfies the gross substitutes property if for any good i, increasing pi leads to increased demand for all other
goods. The market satisfiesweak gross substitutes if the demand for every other good increases or stays the same. Examples
of markets that may satisfy the gross substitutes property include markets of raw materials, energy, airline seats, toll roads.
A broad enough market will not satisfy this property. Consider, for example, the market for bread and jam.
Next, we state some common concepts/assumptions regarding the market problem.
Walras’ Law:8 For any price vector p, ∑
i∈G
zi(p)pi = 0. (3)
Homogeneity of degree 0:9 For all price vectors p and scalars α > 0, x(p) = x(αp).
Numeraire: Under the assumption of homogeneity, if there is at least one equilibrium price vector, then there is an entire
ray of equilibria. It is convenient to use normalization to remove this duplication. A common form of normalization used
in the economics literature is the concept of the numeraire: choose one good as the numeraire; set its price to 1; scale all
other prices accordingly.10 We use money as the numeraire, and use the index $ to denote this good. Usually the choice
of a good to be the numeraire is viewed as arbitrary. However, as we will see, the rate of convergence of our algorithms
also depends on how pervasively the numeraire is present throughout the market, and consequently we do not view it as an
arbitrary choice.
Uniqueness of Equilibria: It is well-known that under normalization, markets of gross substitutes have a unique equi-
librium.11 Since we focus on markets satisfying gross substitutes, the markets we consider have a unique equilibrium.
Throughout the paper we will use the superscript ∗ to denote a characteristic of an equilibrium. For example, p∗ is the
equilibrium price vector; x∗ is the equilibrium demand.
The Parameters
Here, we define the three parameters E,α, β appearing in our analysis.
Elasticity of Demand and the Parameter E: The price elasticity of demand is the fractional rate of change of demand
with respect to price: ∂xi/∂pixi/pi . Under the assumption of gross substitutes, this is negative. The parameter E is an upper
bound on the absolute value of this quantity over all goods and all prices:
E = −min
i,p
∂xi/∂pi
xi/pi
In general E could be unbounded (e.g., when utility functions are linear). Intuitively, it is clear that the larger E is, the
smaller the price adjustments should be for a given level of excess demand; as a result λ needs to be chosen correspondingly
small enough so that adjustments ensure convergence. Were the value of the fractional derivative consistent for all prices
this would not matter. However, when E is large, (∂xi/∂pi)/(xi/pi) cannot be large for all prices and goods12. The
outcome is an O(1/E) convergence speed.
Normal Goods and the Parameter β: Good i is said to be normal for agent l if ∂xil(p, vl)/∂vl ≥ 0, where vl is
the wealth of agent l.13 We impose the slightly stronger constraint that states for all (p, vl) there is a β > 0 such that
∂xil(p, vl)/∂vl ≥ βxil/vl. In words, it says that the fractional rate of change of demand with respect to wealth is lower
bounded by a strictly positive value. We call this the wealth effect.
8See Mas-Colell [16], page 23.
9Ibid.
10Ibid., page 24.
11Ibid., page 613.
12For if E > 1 for all prices and goods, imagine starting at equilibrium prices and then reducing the price for one good; eventually all interested
buyers would be purchasing only that good; any further price reductions would induce a rate of change of demand for that good with E ≤ 1.
13See Mas-Colell [16], p. 25. This is considered a reasonable constraint for broad categories of goods, such as “food”: i.e. as wealth increases,
spending on food generally increases, although spending on specific types of food may decrease.
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The Numeraire and the Parameter α: A separate parameter αi is defined for each good i. In words, αi is the fractional
amount of the supply of good i that is purchased using the portion of the wealth due to the allocation of money (the
numeraire) alone, at equilibrium prices. Intuitively, α is a measure of the utility of money relative to other goods at
equilibrium prices. Formally,
αi =
1
wi
∑
l
x∗ilw$l∑
k wklp
∗
k
.
We then define α = mini αi.
To see why the α could have a natural effect on the convergence rate in markets with a numeraire (such as money),
consider the following example market: a market in which there is no allocation of money. Then doubling all prices (given
homogeneity of degree zero) would have no effect on demand. It is now plausible, and turns out to be the case, that if only
very little money is present in the market (i.e. at equilibrium, the value of the money is very small compared to that of the
other goods), then the effect of price changes on demand is muted (or viewed inversely, even if the prices are quite far from
equilibrium, the excess demands, and hence the signal they provide, are small).14
We note that in markets with CES utilities, E = s and β = 1, while in markets with Cobb-Douglas utilities E = 1 and
β = 1.15
3 Protocols and Results
The price update protocol for good i 6= $ in the fixed market setting is
pi ← pi(1 + 1
λi
min{1, zi
wi
}). (4)
where λi is a small enough fixed value for good i. We show that λi ≤ { 16E ,
√
5− 2} for all i is small enough to prove fast
convergence.16
Our convergence result depends on a natural, but slightly technical, notion of distance of a price to the equilibrium
price. We define the distance between prices pi and p∗i to be
p∗i
pi
if p∗i ≥ 3pi, p
∗
i−pi
p∗i
if pi ≤ p∗i < 3pi, and pi−p
∗
i
p∗i
if
p∗i < pi.
17 The motivation for this definition is that if there is a big gap between pi and p∗i , then our goal is to reduce the
ratio, while if pi is close to p∗i , then our goal is to reduce their difference. We let ηi(pi) denote this distance for good i, and
η(p) = maxi ηi(pi). For simplicity of notation, we drop the argument of η when it is clear from context.
Theorem 3.1 The price update protocol given by (4), in weak gross substitutes markets with parameters α, β,E, and
initial prices p◦ > 0, yields price vector p satisfying η(p) ≤ δ in O( 1αβλ (log η(p
◦)
δ )) rounds, where λi ≤ { 16E ,
√
5 − 2}
for all i, and λ = mini λi.
We prove this theorem in Section 4.1. Although prior work has shown that for suitably small choices of λi there is
a tatonnement-style price update protocol that converges to equilibrium prices, there has been no prior successful effort
to devise and analyze a protocol for which convergence is rapid. Theorem 3.1 provides the first polynomial convergence
guarantee for any tatonnement-style protocol with independent price updates, even with λi at a fixed value.
As the following theorem asserts, this bound is tight for protocol (4). This is proved in the Appendix.
14One might be tempted to argue that one should measure the quality of an approximate equilibria in terms of the excess demands rather than the
error in the prices, but this will have no effect on the rate of convergence, although it can change the percentage error.
15A CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) utility function has the following form: (
P
j ajx
ρ
j )
1
ρ , for aj ≥ 0. A market with agents that have CES
utility functions with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 satisfies the gross substitutes property.
In the definition of the CES function, ρ = s−1
s
, where s is the elasticity of substitution. Intuitively, smeasures the degree to which demand for goods
shift in response to a change in price. A high value of s corresponds to a highly volatile market. Thus, when agents have near linear utilities with ρ
approaching 1, small changes in price can lead to large swings in demand.
An agent has a Cobb-Douglas utility function if it seeks to spend fixed fractions of its wealth on the various goods, i.e. agent l seeks to spend ailvl
on good i, The utility function
Q
l(xil)
ail , where
P
l ail = 1, ail ≥ 0 achieves this.
16It might not be necessary that λi be this small for all i to get convergence. This depends on the individual changes in rates of demand with respect
to price.
17The combination of the assumptions of weak gross substitutes and the wealth effect prevent p∗i = 0. To see this, start with equilibrium prices
and reduce all prices (except money) by factor f > 1. The demand for all goods other than money increases by at least fβ , including the goods with
price zero. But the price of these goods has not changed, and other prices have only decreased. This contradicts the weak gross substitute property.
Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume that p◦ > 0.
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Theorem 3.2 For all 13 ≥ α > 0, 1 ≥ β > 0, E ≥ 1, in weak gross substitutes markets with parameters α, β,E,
there are initial prices p◦ > 0 such that for any final prices p satisfying η(p) ≤ δ, the price update procedure takes
Ω( 1αβλ (log
η(p◦)
δ )) rounds.
If the market is liable to change, it is helpful to have a more flexible update protocol. We consider the following. To
start, λi = 12 . Let ni be the number of updates to pi.
pi ← pi + 12dlog4 nie pimin{1,
zi
wi
} (5)
Theorem 3.3 The price update protocol (5) with b-bounded asynchrony, in weak gross substitutes markets with parameters
α, β,E, and initial prices p◦ > 0, yields price vector p satisfying η(p) ≤ δ afterO( bα2β2 (E+log max{1,η(p
◦)}
δ )
2) rounds.
We prove this theorem in Section 4.2.
4 Proofs of Convergence
In the next two subsections we prove Theorems 3.1 and 3.3. The proof of Theorem 3.3 depends heavily on the lemmas
developed for the proof of Theorem 3.1.
4.1 The Fixed Protocol
In this section we prove Theorem 3.1.
For simplicity of notation, we assume throughout this section and the remainder of the paper that wi = 1 for all
goods.18 The implications of this is that now the updates have the form
pi ← pi(1 + λimin{zi, 1});
the excess demand zi = xi − wi ≥ 0− 1 = −1 for all goods i, for any set of prices; and αi =
∑
l
x∗ilw$lP
k wklp
∗
k
.
Consider the update rule pi ← pi(1 + λimin{zi, 1}). We want to show that this rule “improves” the worst price by
a constant factor in one round. In particular, this means that if zi is small, then it is roughly proportional to
p∗i−pi
p∗i
. To
demonstrate this we bound xi by a polynomial in pip∗i which yields an O(
|p∗i−pi|
p∗i
) bound for |zi| when pi is close to p∗i .
Recall the definitions of α, β, and E given in Section 2.
Lemma 4.1 Let p be a price vector, x the corresponding demand vector. Let x′ be the demand vector when pi is replaced
with p′i < pi, and all other prices are unchanged. Then
x′i
xi
≤
(
pi
p′i
)E
Proof: Using the definition of E, we have that ∂∂pi (p
E
i xi) = Ep
E−1
i xi+p
E
i
∂xi
∂pi
≥ EpE−1i xi−EpE−1i xi = 0. Thus pEi xi
is an increasing function of pi. Consequently, (p′i)
Ex′i ≤ pEi xi or x
′
i
xi
≤ (pip′i )
E .
Corollary 4.2 Let p,q with q ≤ p be two price vectors. Then
xi(q)
xi(p)
≤
(
pi
qi
)E
.
Proof: Let q˜ be the price vector q with qi replaced by pi. By weak gross substitutes, xi(q˜) ≤ xi(p). Thus, using
Lemma 4.1, we have that xi(q)xi(p) ≤
xi(q)
xi(eq) ≤ (piqi )E .
Lemma 4.3 If the wealth vl of buyer l is multiplied by a ≥ 1 with no change in prices, (e.g., by increasing wil uniformly
for all i), then the relationship of the new demand x′ to the old demand x satisfies x
′
il
xil
≥ aβ .
18This is without loss of generality and may be attained by changing the units of good i.
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Proof: Using the definition of β, we have that ∂∂vl (v
−β
l xil) = −βv−β−1l xil+v−βl ∂xil∂vl ≥ −βv
−β−1
l xil+βv
−β−1
l xil = 0.
Thus v−βl xil is an increasing function of vl. Consequently, (avl)
−βx′il ≥ v−βl xil or x
′
il
xil
≥ aβ .
For each buyer l, define yl to be the fraction of buyer l’s wealth at equilibrium prices due to its allocation of money.
That is,
yl :=
w$l∑
k wklp
∗
k
.
Note that (since we have assumed wi = 1)
αi =
∑
`
ylx
∗
i`. (6)
Without loss of generality, let 1 = argmini
pi
p∗i
and n = argmaxi
pi
p∗i
. We define upper and lower bounds on demand as
a function of p1 and pn, as follows
`(p1) := 1 + α
[(
p∗1
p1
)β
− 1
]
u(pn) :=
(
1− α
[
1−
(
p∗n
pn
)])β
Let ri := pip∗i
p∗1
p1
≥ 1 and si := pip∗i
p∗n
pn
≤ 1.
Lemma 4.4 (i) If p1 ≤ p∗1, then for all goods i, xi ≥ `(p1)r−Ei .
(ii) If pn ≥ p∗n, then for all goods i, xi ≤ u(pn)s−Ei .
Proof: We first prove (i). Let f := p
∗
1
p1
≥ 1. Suppose that all prices, including the price of money, were reduced from
the equilibrium values by a factor of f . By homogeneity, this has no effect on the demands. Now imagine restoring the
price of money to p$ = 1 in two stages: first by changing the seller’s price (and thus the wealth), and then by changing the
buyer’s price (and thus the demand for money relative to other goods). In the first stage p$ remains at 1/f , but the wealth
of each buyer ` is increased to equal what it would be were p$ = 1. Let v˜` denote this wealth and let x˜i denote the demands
after the first stage. The second stage sets p$ = 1 but does not alter the wealth any further. Recall, vl =
∑
i wilp
∗
i .
By Lemma 4.3, x˜i` ≥ x∗i` ( ev`v`/f )β for all goods i. In the second stage, weak gross substitutes implies the demand for
good i 6= $ either increases or remains the same. As
x˜i` ≥ x∗i` (
v˜`
v`/f
)β ,
and
v˜`
v`/f
=
v`
f + w$`(1− 1f )
v`
f
= 1 + (1− 1
f
)
w$`
v`/f
= 1 + (f − 1)y`,
it follows that x˜i` ≥ [1 + (f − 1)y`]β x∗i` and x˜i ≥
∑
` x
∗
i`[1 + (f − 1)y`]β .
Given that aβ is a concave function of a for 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, this expression is minimized by setting y` to extreme values (0
or 1). The expression for α1 in (6) limits the extent to which yl can be set to 1, yielding
x˜i ≥ [(1− α1) + α1(1 + f − 1)β ]x∗i = (1− α1) + α1fβ ≥ 1 + α(fβ − 1) = `(p1).
Finally, all prices are increased to their actual values pi, by multiplying by ri. Corollary 4.2 implies that
xi ≥ x˜ir−Ei ≥ `(p1)r−Ei .
The proof of (ii) is in the Appendix.
The proof of the next lemma uses the following fact, which is proved in the Appendix using Taylor series expansions.
Fact 4.5 (a) If δ ≥ −1 and either a ≤ 0, or a ≥ 1, then (1 + δ)a ≥ 1 + aδ.
(b) If 0 ≥ δ ≥ −12 and 0 < a < 1, then (1 + δ)a ≥ 1 + 2aδ.
(c) If δ ≥ −1 and 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, then (1 + δ)a ≤ 1 + aδ.
(d) If − 12 ≤ δ < 1 and 0 < aδ ≤ 12 , then (1 + δ)a ≤ 1 + 2aδ.
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In what follows, let pi denote the current value of price i and p′i denote its value following its next update.
Lemma 4.6 If, for all i, λi ≤ min{1/6E,
√
5− 2} then:
(i) If p1 ≥ p∗1, then p′i ≥ p∗i .
(ii) If p1 < p∗1 then p
′
i ≥ p∗i p1p∗1 [1 + λ min{1, `(p1)− 1}].
(iii) If pn ≤ p∗n, then p′i ≤ p∗i .
(iv) If pn > p∗n, then p
′
i ≤ p∗i pnp∗n [1− λ(1− u(pn))].
Proof: We begin by showing (i) and (ii).
Case 1 zi ≥ 1.
p′i
p∗i
= pip∗i (1 + λ) ≥
p1
p∗1
(1 + λ).
If p1 ≥ p∗1, then p′i ≥ p∗i and so (i) is true for p′i. Otherwise (ii) is true for p′i.
Case 2 zi < 1 and p1 ≥ p∗1.
Then pi ≥ p∗i . In this case, Corollary 4.2 implies that xi ≥
(
p∗i
pi
)E
, and
p′i
p∗i
=
pi
p∗i
(1 + λzi) =
pi
p∗i
(1 + λxi − λ)
≥ pi
p∗i
[
1 + λ
(
p∗i
pi
)E
− λ
]
If pip∗i ≥ 2 then
p′i
p∗i
≥ 2[1− λ] ≥ 1 as λ ≤ 12 .
Otherwise, using Fact 4.5 (b),
p′i
p∗i
≥ pi
p∗i
[1 + λ(1 + 2E(
p∗i
pi
− 1))− λ]
=
pi
p∗i
[1− λ2E(1− p
∗
i
pi
)] ≥ 1 if λ ≤ 1
2E
so that (i) holds for i.
Case 3 p1 < p∗1 and
pi
p∗i
(1− λ) ≥ p1p∗1 (1 + λ).
Then p
′
i
p∗i
≥ pip∗i (1− λ) ≥
p1
p∗1
(1 + λ), so that (ii) holds for i.
Case 4 zi < 1, p1 < p∗1, and
pi
p∗i
(1− λ) < p1p∗1 (1 + λ).
The analysis of this case uses techniques similar to Case 2. Details, as well as the proofs of (iii) and (iv), are in the
appendix.
Corollary 4.7 Let pi be the price of good i at the start of a round and p′i be the price at the end of the round. If λi ≤ 16E
for all i, and λ = mini λi then
(i) If p1 ≥ p∗1, then all p′i ≥ p∗i .
(ii If p1 < p∗1 then all p
′
i ≥ p∗i p1p∗1 [1 + λ min{1, `(p1)− 1}].
(iii) If pn ≤ p∗n, then all p′i ≤ p∗i .
(iv) If pn > p∗n, then all p
′
i ≤ p∗i pnp∗n [1− λ(1− u(pn))].
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Proof: This follows from a simple induction over the sequence of updates in the round, using Lemma 4.7 to bound the
effect of a single update.
Remark: Suppose that instead of using the current value of zi for calculating the update to pi, the price setter uses
a value of zi from some point since the last update to pi, or any convex combination of such values. The analysis of
Lemma 4.6 and Corollary 4.7 is readily modified to cover this case, but instead of assuring progress from round to round,
it now assures progress every second round. We give details in the Appendix.
Lemma 4.8 If λi ≤ 16E for all i and λ = mini λi,
(i) If mini pip∗i ≤
1
3 , then mini
pi
p∗i
is doubled in at most 3αβλ rounds.
(ii) If 13 ≤ mini pip∗i ≤ 1, then 1−mini
pi
p∗i
is reduced by half in at most 3αβλ rounds.
(iii) If maxi pip∗i > 1, then maxi
pi
p∗i
− 1, is reduced by half in at most 1αβλ rounds.
Proof: As before, we fix the indices so that p1p∗1 = mini
pi
p∗i
and pnp∗n = maxi
pi
p∗i
.
We first prove (i) and (ii). From Corollary 4.7, we have that if mini pip∗i < 1, then in one round
p′i
p∗i
≥ p1p∗1 [1 +
λ min{1, `(p1)− 1}]. Now,
l(p1)− 1 = α[(p1
p∗1
)−β − 1] ≥ α[1 + β(1− p1
p∗1
)− 1] using Fact 4.5(a)
= αβ(1− p1
p∗1
)
Thus p
′
i
p∗i
≥ p1p∗1 [1 + λαβ(1 −
p1
p∗1
)]. Hence, if p1p∗1 remains bounded by
1
3 , then in at most
3
λαβ rounds, mini
pi
p∗i
doubles,
showing (i). Otherwise, we have that
1− p
′
i
p∗i
≤ 1− p1
p∗1
[1 + λαβ(1− p1
p∗1
)] = (1− p1
p∗1
)[1− λαβ p1
p∗1
].
Since p1p∗1 ≥
1
3 , we have that in at most
3
λαβ rounds, (1−mini pip∗i ) is reduced by half, showing (ii).
The proof of (iii) is in the Appendix.
Theorem 4.9 If λi ≤ min{ 16E ,
√
5 − 2} for all i, λ = mini λi, for initial price vector p◦ the tatonnement process
described by (4) yields price vector p satisfying η(p) ≤ δ in O( 1αβλ (log η(p
◦)
δ )) rounds.
Proof: This follows immediately from Lemma 4.8.
4.2 The Oblivious Protocol
Recall the oblivious protocol and the definition of η given in Section 3. In this section, we restate the main result for this
setting, and prove it.
Theorem 4.10 In markets obeying weak gross substitutes, with parameters α, β, E, and initial prices p◦, if prices updates
follow (5) and are b-bounded asynchronous, then η(p) ≤ δ after O( bα2β2 (E + log max{1,η(p
◦)}
δ )
2) rounds.
Proof: We analyze the number of rounds required in two phases. Phase I ends when λi ≤ 16E for all goods i. Phase II ends
when η(p) ≤ δ. In Phase I, we bound four things: the number of rounds, the number of updates to pi, the multiplicative
increase to η(p) over η(p◦) by the end of the phase, and the value of the smallest λi.
As λi = 12r after Θ(4
r) price updates, the number of price updates required to get λi ≤ 16E is Θ(4log 6E) = Θ(E2).
Since each round updates the price of each good at least once, this implies it takes O(E2) rounds to obtain λi ≤ 16E , for
all i.
By b-bounded asynchrony, in any one round, the price of a good could be updated at most b times. Thus, the total
number of updates to pi by the end of Phase I is O(bE2). Using the above reasoning in reverse, this implies that the
smallest λi at the end of Phase I is Ω( 1Eb1/2 ).
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While λi = 12r there areΘ(4
r)multiplicative updates to the price pi that are at least (1−λ) and at most (1+λ). Thus,
the ratio of pi to p∗i worsens by at most 4
2r . By the time λi ≤ 16E , this total increase to the ratio is at most 424E . (Note
424E ≥ 42+4+...+(2k) for k = dlog(6E)e.) After this point, the proof of Lemma 4.6 implies that the ratio for the price of
good i does not get worse than the worst ratio of the remaining goods. Thus, at the end of Phase I, the worst ratio of price
to equilibrium price is bounded by max{1, η(p◦)}424E .
We now bound the number of rounds in Phase II. Phase II starts with price vector p′, the price vector at the end of
Phase I. Note that from the arguments for Phase I, that η(p′) ≤ max{1, η(p◦)}424E . For simplicity, we assume Phase II
starts with λ = mini λi = 1Eb1/2 having just halved. Thus for imin = argminλi, λimin remains at this value for the next
E2b updates which occur over at least σ1 rounds, for some σ1 ∈ [E2, E2b]. Lemma 4.8 implies that after every 3/(αβλ)
round ηi(p′i) decreases by a factor of at least
1
2 . Thus, over the course of these σ1 rounds, η(p
′) decreases by a factor of at
least 2−αβσ1/(3Eb
1/2).
After σ1 updates with λ = mini λi = 13Eb1/2 , λ may be halved, and the process is iterated. In general, let λ =
mini λi = 1Eb1/2 2
−r. Let κr = αβσr/(3Eb1/2) for σr ∈ [E2, E2b]. There are at least σr4r rounds with λ = 1Eb1/2 2−r,
after which η(p′) has decreased by at least a factor of 2−κr2
r
. Thus when 2r = 1κr (48E + log
max{1,η(p◦)}
δ ), η(p) ≤ δ.
This happens after O(σr4r) rounds. Choosing σr ∈ [E2, E2b] to maximize this expression yields σr = E2 and σr4r =
9b
(αβ)2 (48E + log
max{1,η(p◦)}
δ )
2; thus the total number of rounds in Phase II is O( bα2β2 (E + log
max{1,η(p◦)}
δ )
2). This
dominates the number of rounds in Phase I.
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5 Appendix
This section contains missing (parts of) proofs in the paper.
5.1 Fact 4.5
We prove Fact 4.5(a)–(c), using a simplified version of Taylor’s Theorem. First, we restate the fact:
(a) If δ ≥ −1 and either a ≤ 0, or a ≥ 1, then (1 + δ)a ≥ 1 + aδ.
(b) If 0 ≥ δ ≥ −12 and 0 < a < 1, then (1 + δ)a ≥ 1 + 2aδ.
(c) If δ ≥ −1 and 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, then (1 + δ)a ≤ 1 + aδ.
Theorem 5.1 (Taylor) If f is a twice differentiable function in the interval [0, x] (or [x, 0], if x < 0) then there is a
ξ ∈ [0, x] ( or ξ ∈ [x, 0], if x < 0) such that
f(x) = f(0) + f ′(0) ∗ x+ f
′′(ξ)
2
x2.
Let f(x) = (1 + x)c. Then f ′(x) = c(1 + x)c−1, f ′′(x) = c(c − 1)(1 + x)c−2, f(0) = 1, and f ′(0) = c. Thus we
have that
(1 + x)c = 1 + cx+
c(c− 1)
2
(1 + ξ)c−2x2.
If the last term is nonnegative, then we have that (1 + x)c ≥ 1 + cx. The last term is nonnegative provided that x ≥ −1
(implying ξ ≥ −1) and either c ≥ 1 or c ≤ 0. This is (a).
If the last term is nonpositive, then we have that (1 + x)c ≤ 1+ cx. The last term is nonpositive provided that x ≥ −1
and 0 ≤ c ≤ 1. This is (c).
(b) holds if the last term is at least cx. This is true since cx < 0 and 0 < (c−1)2 (1+ ξ)
c−2x < 1 when 0 ≥ ξ ≥ x ≥ −12
and 0 < c < 1.
Fact 4.5 (d) is obtained by bounding the limit of the infinite Taylor series for (1 + δ)a.
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5.2 Lemma 4.4
Here, we give the second half of the proof of Lemma 4.4.
The proof for (ii) uses similar arguments. Here, let f := p
∗
n
pn
≤ 1. Suppose all prices, including that for money, were
increased from the equilibrium values by a factor of 1f . All demands are unchanged. Again, in the first two stages, the
wealth is reduced to w˜, and then p$ is reset to 1. After Stage 1, by Lemma 4.3,
x˜i` ≤ x∗i`
(
v˜`
f v`
)β
for all i,
where
v˜`
f v`
=
f v` − (f − 1)w$`
f v`
= 1− (f − 1) w$`
f v`
= 1− (1− 1
f
)y`.
Thus x˜i` ≤ [1− y` + y`/f ]β x∗i` and x˜i ≤
∑
` x
∗
i` [1− y` + y`/f ]β . This sum is maximized when all y` are equal (to αi).
Thus
x˜i ≤ x∗i (1− αi + αi/f)β ≤ (1− α(1− 1/f))β .
Finally, each price pi, i 6= n, is reduced (multiplied) by si to obtain the target price p. The result, invoking Corollary 4.2,
is
xi ≤ x˜is−E ≤ u(pn)s−Ei .
5.3 Lemma 4.6
Here we give the analysis for Case 4 and the second half of the proof of Lemma 4.6.
Case 4 zi < 1, p1 < p∗1, and
pi
p∗i
(1− λ) < p1p∗1 (1 + λ).
In this case, by Lemma 4.4, xi ≥ `(p1)r−Ei . If λ ≤ 15E , then ri ≤ 1+λ1−λ ≤ 32 and E(ri − 1) ≤ 12 . Thus, Fact 4.5(d)
with δ = ri − 1 implies that `(p1) ≤ xirEi ≤ 2(1 + 2E(ri − 1)) ≤ 4.
p′i
p∗i
≥ pi
p∗i
[1 + λ(`(p1)r−Ei − 1)]
≥ p1
p∗1
ri[1 + λ`(p1)(1− E(ri − 1))− λ] using Fact 4.5 (a)
≥ p1
p∗1
[1 + (ri − 1) + λ(`(p1)− 1)− ri(ri − 1)λE`(p1)]
≥ p1
p∗1
[1 + λ(`(p1)− 1) + (ri − 1)(1− λriE`(p1))]
so that (ii) holds for i if λ ≤ 16E (using l(p1) ≤ 4 and ri ≤ 32 ).
Next, we show (iii) and (iv).
Case 1 pn(1 + λ) ≤ p∗n.
By the update, p′i ≤ pi(1 + λ); so p
′
i
p∗i
≤ pip∗i (1 + λ) ≤
pn
p∗n
(1 + λ) ≤ 1, and (iii) holds.
Case 2 pip∗i (1 + λ) ≤
pn
p∗n
(1− λ).
Then p
′
i
p∗i
≤ pip∗i (1 + λ) ≤
pn
p∗n
(1− λ).
If pn ≤ p∗n, then (iii) holds for i; otherwise (iv) holds for i.
Case 3 p∗n/(1 + λ) < pn ≤ p∗n, and pip∗i (1 + λ) ≥
pn
p∗n
(1− λ).
Note that pi ≤ p∗i .
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By Corollary 4.2, xi ≤
(
pi
p∗i
)−E
. Note that 1− pip∗i ≤ 1−
pn
p∗n
1−λ
1+λ ≤ 1− 1−λ(1+λ)2 ≤ 3λ for λ ≤ 1. Similarly, 1− pip∗i ≤ 1/2
if λ ≤ √5− 2 < .2362. Thus
p′i
p∗i
≤ pi
p∗i
(1 + λzi)
≤ pi
p∗i
[1 + λ
(
pi
p∗i
)−E
− λ]
≤ pi
p∗i
[1 + λ(1 + 2E(1− pi
p∗i
))− λ] if E(1− pip∗i ) ≤
1
2 and δ = −(1− pip∗i ) ≥ −
1
2 by Fact 4.5(d);
λ ≤ min{
√
5− 2, 1
6E
} suffices.
≤ 1− (1− pi
p∗i
) + 2λE(1− pi
p∗i
)
≤ 1− (1− pi
p∗i
)(1− 2λE)
≤ 1 if λ ≤ 1
2E
.
So (iii) holds for i.
Case 4 pn > p∗n and
pi
p∗i
(1 + λ) ≥ pnp∗n (1− λ).
In this case, 1− si ≤ 1− 1−λ1+λ ≤ 2λ; 1− si ≤ 12 if λ ≤ 13 ; and u(pn) ≤ 1. Lemma 4.4 implies that xi ≤ u(pn)s−Ei .
p′i
p∗i
≤ pi
p∗i
(1 + λzi)
≤ pn
p∗n
si(1 + λu(pn)s−Ei − λ)
≤ pn
p∗n
si[1 + λu(pn)(1 + 2E(1− si))− λ] if E(1− si) ≤ 12 and δ = −(1− si) ≥ −12 by Fact 4.5(d);
λ ≤ min{1
3
,
1
4E
} suffices.
=
pn
p∗n
[1− (1− si)][1 + λu(pn)− λ+ λu(pn)2E(1− si))]
≤ pn
p∗n
[1 + λu(pn)− λ− (1− si)(1 + λu(pn)− λ) + (1− si)λu(pn)2E
=
pn
p∗n
[1 + λu(pn)− λ− (1− si)(1 + λu(pn)− λ− λu(pn)2E)]
≤ pn
p∗n
[1 + λu(pn)− λ] for λ ≤ 13E .
Hence (iv) holds for i.
5.4 Remark
To set this up, we need to consider the smallest and largest values pi/p∗i over the course of a round: let p˜
r
i = minround r pi.
Without loss of generality, suppose that 1 = argmini{p˜i/p∗i }. We show that:
(1) If p˜ 2ri ≥ p∗i then p˜ 2r+2i ≥ p∗i .
(2) If p˜ 2ri < p
∗
i then p˜
2r+2
i ≥ p∗i ep 2r1p∗1 [1 + min{1, l(p˜ 2r1 )− 1}].
and analogous claims with respect to p˜n, where n = argmaxip˜i/p∗i .
The analysis of updates in round 2r + 1 and subsequently obeys Lemma 4.6 with p˜ 2r1 replacing p1 and p
′
i being the
updated value (strictly, we need to argue inductively that p˜1 can only improve in the following sense: for all i, during round
2r + 1 or later, p˜i ≥ p∗i ep 2r1p∗1 ). As a result, by the start of round r + 2 all prices have been updated, obey (1) and (2) above,
and continue to do so.
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5.5 Lemma 4.8
In this section we give the rest of the proof of Lemma 4.8.
We next prove (iii). From Lemma 4.6, we have that if maxi pip∗i > 1, then in one round
p′i
p∗i
≤ pnp∗n [1 − λ (1 − u(pn))].
We bound u(pn) from above:
u(pn) = (1− α[1− p
∗
n
pn
])β
≤ 1− αβ(1− p
∗
n
pn
]) using Fact 4.5(c).
Hence
p′i
p∗i
− 1 ≤ pn
p∗n
[1− λαβ(1− p
∗
n
pn
)]− 1
=
pn
p∗n
(1− λαβ) + λαβ − 1
= (
pn
p∗n
− 1)(1− λαβ)
and pnp∗n − 1 is reduced by at least half in at most
1
λαβ rounds.
5.6 Lower Bounds
We give two lower bounds; the first shows that the convergence rate is tight for α and E together, the second shows it is
tight for α and β together, and then a simple observation combines the two bounds, showing the convergence rate is tight
for all three parameters at once.
Lemma 5.2 There is a market Mα1 with E = 1, β = 1, such that for any α ≤ 1 with λ = 2 there is a sequence of price
updates using protocol (4) that does not converge.
Proof: Consider the following market Mα1 with buyers having identical Cobb-Douglas utilities. Suppose there are two
goods G1 and G2 plus money in the market. Let p∗1 = p
∗
2 = a be the equilibrium price. Then α = 1/(2a + 1). Suppose
that the two prices are always updated simultaneously. Suppose that the initial prices are p1 = a(1+ δ) and p2 = a(1− δ).
Then, as we will show, each update swaps the prices, i.e. the first updates set p′1 = a(1− δ) and p′2 = a(1 + δ), and so on.
By definition, p1 + p2 + 1 = 2a + 1. We note that x1p1 = x2p2 = ax$ (as spending on each good is in the ratio
a : a : 1). Further, by Walrus’ Law,
x1p1 + x2p2 + x$ = p1 + p2 + 1.
Substituting gives (2a+ 1)x$ = 2a+ 1; therefore x$ = 1.
x1 ≤ 2 so long as p1 ≥ a/2, which holds for |δ| ≤ 12 . Then p′1 = p1[1 + λ(x1 − 1)] = p1 + λp1x1 − λp1 =
a(1 + δ) + λa− λa(1 + δ) = a(1 + δ − λδ) = a(1− δ).
Similarly, p′2 = p2[1 + λ(x2 − 1)] = p1 + λp2x2 − λp2 = a(1− δ) + λa− λa(1− δ) = a(1− δ + λδ) = a(1 + δ).
Comment: If λ > 2, say λ = 1+1/δ, δ < 1, then in the above scenario, p′1 = 0. This implies that the algorithm specified
by protocol (4) can fail for any λ > 2.
Corollary 5.3 In MarketMα the protocol (4) requires Θ(1/α) rounds to improve the accuracy of the price by one bit.
Proof: By Lemma 5.2 and the subsequent comment, λ < 2.
Consider the following scenario. Initially, p1 = p2 = ad, d > 1. Suppose p1 and p2 are updated simultaneously. Then
x$ =
p1 + p2 + 1
2a+ 1
=
2p1 + 1
2a+ 1
and
2p1x1 = p1 + p2 + 1− x$ = 2p1 + 1− 2p1 + 12a+ 1 .
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Thus
p′1 = p1(1 + λ(x1 − 1)) = p1 + λp1x1 − λp1
= p1 +
λ
2
[
2p1 + 1− 2p1 + 12a+ 1
]
− λp1
= p1 +
λ
2
[
2a+ 1− 2p− 1
2a+ 1
]
= p1 − λa(d− 1)2a+ 1
≥ p1 − 2ad2a+ 1 = p1(1− 2α)
Next, we show that to first order, the same scenario arises in markets with CES utilities, for arbitrary ρ; recall that
E = 1/(1− ρ).
Lemma 5.4 There is a market MαE with β = 1, such that for any α ≤ 1 and E > 1 with λ = 2/E the price update
protocol (4) does not converge in any bounded time.
Proof: Consider the following market MαE with buyers having identical CES utilities. Suppose there are two goods G1
and G2 plus money in the market. Let p∗1 = p
∗
2 = a be the equilibrium price. Then α = 1/(2a + 1). Suppose that
the two prices are always updated simultaneously. Suppose that the initial prices are p1 = a(1 + δ) and p2 = a(1 − δ).
Then, as we will show, to first order, each update swaps the prices, i.e. the first updates set p′1 = a(1 − δ + O(δ2)) and
p′2 = a(1 + δ +O(δ
2)), and so on.
By definition, p1 + p2 + 1 = 2a+ 1. We note that as the utilities are CES with parameter ρ, x1pE1 = x2p
E
2 = a
Ex$.
Thus x1(1 + δ)E = x$ or x1 = x$(1− Eδ +O(δ2)), assuming Eδ ≤ 12 . Likewise, x2 = x$(1 + Eδ +O(δ2)). Further,
by Walras’ Law,
x1p1 + x2p2 + x$ = p1 + p2 + 1 = 2a+ 1.
Substituting gives
x1p1 + x2p2 + x$ = x$(1− Eδ +O(δ2))a(1 + δ) + x$(1 + Eδ +O(δ2))a(1− δ) + x$
= x$(2a+ 1) +O(aδ2)
Thus x$ = 1 +O(δ2), and so x1 = 1− Eδ +O(δ2) and x2 = 1 + Eδ +O(δ2).
Then
p′1 = p1(1 + λ(x1 − 1))
= a(1 + δ)[1 + (2/E)(1− Eδ +O(δ)2 − 1)]
= a(1− δ +O(δ)2) = p2 +O(aδ2)
Likewise, p′2 = p1 +O(aδ
2).
Choosing δ arbitrarily small ensures arbitrarily poor progress.
Comment: If λ > 2/E, then following the above analysis yields p′1 = a(1 − δ(Eλ − 1) + 0(δ2)) and p′2 =
a(1 + δ(Eλ − 1) + 0(δ2)). Thus, by starting with δ suitably small, we can ensure that the prices move away from
equilibrium for an arbitrary amount of time (although conceivably this eventually reverses).
Corollary 5.5 In Market MαE , for α ≤ 13 and E > 1, our protocol requires Θ(E/α) rounds to improve the accuracy of
the price by one bit.
Proof: By Lemma 5.4 and the subsequent comment, λ < 2/E.
Consider the following scenario. Initially pi = γp∗i = γa, for i = 1, 2, with
1
2 ≤ γ < 1. Now x1 = x2, xi(γa)E =
aEx$. Walrus’ Law then yields x$(1 + 2γ−E+1a) = 2γa+ 1. So
xi =
2γa+ 1
2γa+ γE
.
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Hence
p′1 = p
′
2 = γa
(
1 + λ
2γa+ 1− 2γa− γE
2γa+ γE
)
= γa
(
1 +
λ(1− γE)
2γa+ γE
)
≤ γa
(
1 +
2/E
2γa
)
≤ γa(1 + 2/(Ea)) if γ ≥ 12
≤ γa(1 + Θ(α/E))
We turn to the lower bound for α and β.
Lemma 5.6 For any α, β ≤ 1, there is a market M˜αβ such that our price update protocol requires Θ(1/(αβλ) rounds to
improve the worst price by one bit for p near to p∗.
Proof: This result is shown by giving a market in which the demand for p near to p∗ matches what is allowed by the
wealth effect. Consequently, for smallmaxi |pi − p∗i |, the convergence rate matches the upper bounds.
Suppose that there are two goodsG1 andG2 plus money in the market (in fact, one would suffice). Let the equilibrium
price be p∗1 = p
∗
2 = a; so α = 1/a. All buyers will have the same utility function.
We define the demand for good i 6= $ to be
xi(p) = 1 +
β
2a+ 1
(
p∗i
pi
− 1
)
.
To show that this is a legitimate demand, given the prices p, we show that there is enough wealth to buy xi: pixi =
pi + β2a+1 (p
∗
i − pi). If pi ≥ p∗i then there is enough money from the sale of good i to purchase xi. If pi < p∗i , then
this quantity is less than pi + 12a+1 (p
∗
i − pi) < pi + 12 and we can use in addition at most half the wealth from money to
purchase xi for i = 1, 2. Next, we observe that this demand obeys the weak gross substitutes property. First note that this
expression is independent of pj , so that ∂zipi∂pj ≥ 0. To show that
∂zipi
∂pi
≤ 0, observe that
∂zipi
∂pi
= zi + pi
∂zi
∂pi
=
β
2a+ 1
(
p∗i
pi
− 1
)
− pi β2a+ 1
p∗i
p2i
= − β
2a+ 1
< 0.
Finally, we show that ∂z$p$∂pi ≥ 0. Demand for money is x$ = 1 + p1 + p2 − x1p1 − x2p2. Thus
∂z$p$
∂pi
= 1− ∂zipi∂pi > 0.
Next, we define a utility function u(x) yielding this demand.
u(x) =
2∑
i=1
βa log
[
2a+ 1
β
(xi − 1) + 1
]
+ x$
Observe that
∂u
∂xi
=
a(2a+ 1)
2a+1
β (xi − 1) + 1
∂u
∂x$
= 1
We know that at an optimal x, ∂u∂xi /pi = ηi
∂u
∂x$
, for suitable fixed ηi. Evaluating this expression at p∗ yields ηi =
a(2a+ 1)/p∗i = 2a+ 1. So
a(2a+ 1)
2a+1
β (xi − 1) + 1
= pi(2a+ 1)
Or
a
pi
=
2a+ 1
β
(xi − 1) + 1, assuming a = p∗i
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or
β
(
p∗i
pi
− 1
)
= (2a+ 1)(xi − 1)
or
xi = 1 +
β
2a+ 1
(
p∗i
pi
− 1
)
as claimed.
As
zi =
β
2a+ 1
(
p∗i
pi
− 1
)
= βα
(
p∗i
pi
− 1
)
the update p′i = pi(1 + λzi) gives p
′
i = pi(1 + αβλ(
p∗i
pi
− 1)) which is only a constant factor faster progress than what is
claimed in our upper bound. In particular, setting p1 = p2 and having simultaneous updates shows that in this setting the
upper and lower bounds are tight up to constant factors.
Finally, we combine the bounds of the two lemmas.
Theorem 5.7 There is a market Mall such that for any β ≤ 1, α ≤ 13 and E ≥ 1 our price update protocol requires
Θ(E/(αβ)) rounds to improve the worst price by one bit for p near to p∗.
Proof: Mall is the disjoint union of MαE and M˜αβ . For MαE forces λ = O(1/E). Then the convergence rate follows
from Lemma 5.6.
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